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Abstract: State-of-the-art commcrcial microprocessors are attractive for use in cost effective space
missions because, they are readily available, they are of high packaging density, cheap and capable of
supporting extensive software. However, because they are not radiation hardened, they are susceptible to
single event upset (SEU) caused by ionising radiation. Being able to prediet ,in advance, the observable
SEU induced error rate in a mieroprocessor is therefore essential. Using the 8051 processor as an example,
a new method has being developed for this purpose and is presented here.

1. Introduction
An extensive literature review has shown that the
observable SEU induced error rate in a
microprocessor strongly depends on the software it is
executing1.2.3A. With the increasingly important role
played by software on board modern satellites, the
reliability of the software and the platforms on which
it operates is of paramount importance. Although
formal review methods and tools are available for
testing the integrity of software 5, the effects of space
radiation on the microprocessors, and consequently
the execution of the software, are not well
understood I.

Indeed there has been great conservatism m the
adoption of COTS microprocessors for space
because of inadequate information concerning
radiation effects. The University of Surrey through
its research company Surrey Satellite Technology
Limited (SSTL), has built and launched 11
microsatellites since 1981 all of which rely almost
entirely on COTS technology. For example, seven of
these microsatellites each have four 87C51
microcontrollers in its telecommand system for
decoding commands. With the first of these
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satellites launched in January 1990 (UoSAT 3)
and the most recent (CERISE) launched in July
1995, no problems have been found that can be
attributed to SEUs in these microcontrollers. The
imprcssion from these observations is that the
87C51 microcontroller is a reliable device for use
in space. However, space organisations have
avoided using this microcontroller in a similar
space environment after ground based testing and
current methods of predicting single event upsets
(SEUs) suggested that it was not fit for space
use6 . This paper will attempt to explain this
apparent discrepancy. Presented here is a flexible
methodology for quantifying the rate of
observable errors induced by SEUs associated
with a microprocessor executing a given
software.

2. Background
Traditional methods for predicting the observable
SEU induced error rate in microprocessors are
similar to those for memory devices. The first
step is usually to determine a suitable model that
describes the interaction of the test device with
the radiation environment. Although a theoretical
approach could be used to derive such a model, a
simpler approach is to irradiate the device with
11th AIAAfUSU Conference on Small Satellites

ions at suitable energies and determine parameters of
interest. Normally, the memory cells or registers are
loaded with a predefined pattern of bits, irradiated,
and subsequently checked to determine those bits that
have changed state7,8, This mode of testing is
described as the static mode, The device can also be
irradiated in a dynamic mode, whereby, an identical
non-irradiated device is assigned a similar task as the
irradiated device and the outputs of both devices are
continuously compared to determine the number of
observable SEU induced errors,
In a typical UoSAT orbit (700x700 km, 98.25
degrees), SEUs are induced mainly by heavy ions
(galactic and solar cosmic rays) and trapped protons
sampled within the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA),
Therefore, ground testing of a device expected to
operate in this orbit are best performed with both
protons and heavy ions 9
Heavy ions induce SEUs by direct ionisation,
Typically, heavy ion test results are expressed as
SEU cross-section versus LET (Linear Energy
Transfer) as represented in Figure-I, The SEU cross
section (oj is the reciprocal of the fluence (ions/cm 2 )
needed to cause a SEU in the sensitive volume of a
device, The LET of an ion is the amount of energy
deposited per unit path length as the ion traverses the
device, The magnitude of the cross section at a given
LET, is a measure of the device's SEU sensitivity to
ions of that LET
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Figure-I: Measured SED cross-section versus LET curve,

Unlike heavy ions, protons do not usually have
sufficient LETs to cause SEUs by direct
ionisation, However, the interaction of protons
with silicon nuclei generate secondary particles
with sufficient LETs to cause upsets in devices,
In this case, the SEU cross section is measured as
a function of proton energ/,
From radiation test results, the SEU saturation
cross section (Q.mJ, and the LET threshold or
energy threshold for protons can be determined,
The saturation cross section is that cross section
at which all sensitive nodes of the device have
been upset. The "LET or energy threshold" of a
device gives an indication of the amount of
charge that must be deposited to upset a sensitive
node of the device. It is usually taken as the LET
9
at some fraction of the saturation cross section ,
Using these parameters, the SEU rate per bit per
unit time for the device can be determine,
provided a description of the radiation
environment experienced by the spacecraft
electronics
IS
available.
The
radiation
environment inside a spacecraft, is a function of
the spacecraft orbit, spacecraft shielding and
solar activity. With these parameters as inputs, a
computer model such as CREME (Cosmic Ray
Effects on Microelectronics)lO, can be used to
compute the LET spectrum (ion flux versus LET)
inside the spacecraft 11 and hence the heavy ion 9
induced SEU rate. Similarly, the proton energy
spectrum inside the spacecraft can be estimated
and the SEU rate from protons, computed. If
ground based proton testing is not conducted, the
heavy ion data could be used to approximate the
proton induced upset curve 12 . The total SEU rate
per bit per unit time for the device in the defined
orbit is the sum of the SEU rate from heavy ions
and protons 13.
Although the procedures used for making SEU
rate predictions from heavy ion and proton
ground test results have been criticised for
making
unrealistic
assumptions
and
simplifications of what actually happens in
practice, they are presently accepted for
predicting the rate of SEUs in memory
devices 12,14,15,16 A decade of research at the
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University of Surrey into determining the aecuracy of
these models through real in-orbit demonstration, has
shown that these techniques are reasonably accurate
within a factor of ~2-5 for predicting the SEU rates
in COTS memory devices 9 . However, several authors
have remarked that these procedures could
overestimate the observable SEU induced error rate
in microprocessors by many orders of magnitude I. 2•3 .
A microprocessor SEU error is said to be observable
when it can affect the external state of a predefined
system made up of one or more of these
microprocessors.

3. Discussion
Although the basic mechanism by which SEUs occur
in microproccssor registers, is similar to that in
memory circuits, the architecturc and operation of
microprocessors is more complex. Typically,
microprocessors are made up of many functional
units (registers, counters, arithmetic and logic unit
(ALU) , etc.). The basic cell design and the modes of
operation of these units may not be the same. During
the execution of a particular program, it is unlikely
that all of these units will be used at anyone time2,7
As a result, upsets in registers which are not being
used, can be overwritten when these registers are reloaded and are therefore not observed to affect the
external state of the microprocessor's system, The
rate at which registers are loaded and read depends
upon the application software that the microprocessor
is executing. F or this reason, results from
microprocessors' SEU tests can also be reported as
"application cross-section" versus LET as well as
"register-bit cross-sectitm" versus LET.
The register-bit cross-section, can be dctermined
using the method outlined in the previous section2,3. It
is independent of the application softwarc, and
therefore a convcnient measure ofthc SEU sensitivity
of a device. However, when microprocessors are used
for exccuting real satellite application programs, the
register-bit cross-section usually overestimates the
observable upset error rate by many orders of
2
magnitude . This gives a false impression of the
susceptibility of the microprocessor's system to
errors induced by SEUs.

The application cross-section is more useful for
predicting the error rate behaviour of a
microprocessor in actual operation. It is a
measure of the observable SEU cross-section of a
device when it is executing particular application
software, Hence, it varies with the software that
the processor is executing. Two papers have
reported on experiments that were performed to
investigate this concepe A.
To overcome the current conservatism that exists
in the adoption of COTS microprocessors for
space applications, a flexible method of
determining the observable SEU induced error
cross-section for different application programs
must be developed. In Elder and C03 , the
application cross-section (0' T) is defined as the
weighted sum of the individual register crosssections (0';), where the weighting factor (fiJ of a
register is its associated duty factor, defined as
the period of vulnerability of that register
expressed as a percentage of the total program
execution time. That is
n

0'T

L

0', /;

(1),

;=1

where n is the total number of registers in the
microprocessor vulnerable to SEU.
The condition.1i = I for all t, represents 100%
duty cycle. This is the application independent
situation. This measure of SEU vulnerability
reflects the technology of the device. The
application independent cross-section is then
adjusted by the application software through the
registers' duty factors to give the application
cross-section. However, calculating the duty
factor of registers uscd during the execution of
real spacecraft application software was
previously thOUght to be impracticae.

4. A new methodology for
computing the duty cycle it
Using the 8051 microprocessor as an example,
this new methodology attempts to make equation
1 more practical. The aim of the model is to
calculate .Ii for each register of the 8051
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4.2 The Model

microprocessor as it executes real application
software.

Figure-2 is a block diagram representation of the
model. The registers duty cycles are processed in
sequence. Registers believed to be in continuous
usage are automatically assigned a duty cycle of
100%, for all software programs. Although this
might be an over estimation of the duty cycle of
the SP and PSW, this assignment is reasonable
because it is difficult to know when these
registers are being used, because they are mostly
controlled by hardware. To calculate the duty
cycle for the remaining registers, records from the
file are sequentially read and processed in one of
two major loops. Initially, records are processed
in the first loop, in which the aim is to establish if
the current register l was used during execution of
the software and hence the clock cycle at which
this first occurred. As soon as evidence of usage
of the register is identified, the total period for
which the register has been in use (its
accumulative-duty-period) is initialised to zero,
and processing enters the second loop. However,
if the end of the file is reached and no evidence of
usage of the register is identified, it is concluded
that, the register has not being used in the
execution of the software, and its duty cycle is
therefore 0%.

4.1 Resources
Information from three main sources; an 8051
simulator, the 8051 instruction set and the
processor's architecture were used. Firstly, the
information that is processed by the model is
obtained. Using the Kiel Elektronix Dscope-51
simulator l7 , the application software in Intel HEX
format is executed in single-step mode i.e. one
instruction at a time. As each instruction is executed,
the status of all the registers and that of the cycle
counter (clock) are traced and stored as individual
records in a file. The current instruction being
executed is also included in the file.
The 8051 instruction set (which comprises III
instructions) was studied to identify instructions that
are capable or overwriting SEUs. These instructions
were identified to include: data transfer instructions
which write new values into registers, logical
operations which clear the accumulator, and Boolean
variable manipulations. This group of instructions
were described as "duty cycle modification
instructions" .
The third source of information was the CPU
(Central Processing Unit) architecture itself. The
8051 CPU consists of twenty one special function
registers (SFRs), an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU),
a program counter (PC) and other circuitry
interconnected together l8. In addition to the SFRs, the
lower 32 bytes of the internal RAM of all 8051
derivatives consist of four register banks. Each
register bank consists of eight (RO-R7) one byte
registers. The CPU can select and use one of its
bank's registers. Based on their functions, all
registers accessible to the CPU were grouped into
three categories. Registers which are thought to be in
continuous use (PC, PSW and SP), control registers (
TLO, TLl, THO, THl, IP, IE, TMOD, TCON,
SCON, and PCON) and general purpose registers
(ACC, B, DPL, DPH, SBUF, PO-P3 and RO-R7).
Control registers in general, determine the CPU's
mode of operation: For example, they determine the
baud rate, the status of interrupts, etc.

In the second loop, as each record is processed,
the accumulative-duty-period of the register is
incremented accordingly. For a control register, it
is assumed that, if an SEU occurs from the
moment it is initialised until the execution of the
software is complete, it induces an observable
error. "Increment-I" is derived on the basis of
this assumption. Although it might also lead to a
slight overestimation of the upset rate, it is
necessary to keep the model practical.
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Figure-2: A Block Diagram Representation ofthe Duty Cycle Prediction Model.
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typical UoSAT spacecraft can be estimated as the
above predicted value (3.0 x 10-6 bif! day'!).

For the general purpose registers, the increment
("increment-2" or "increment-3") depends on whether
the current instruction]' is a "duty cycle modification
instruction", At the end of processing the last record,
the accumulative-duty-cycle for the register is divided
by the total run time to yield the register's duty cycle,

Table-I: Registers and their respective duty
cycles for the 8051 processor when executing the
UoSA T Telecmmand software .
Duty
.... Duty Cycle
(%)

5. RESULTS
The model was used to analyse the software that
operates the telecommand system on a number of
UoSAT spacecraft. The processor's function as part
of the telecommand subsystem is to decode and issue
commands to other subsystems, The telecommand
frame is seven bytes long and decoding commences
by checking asynchronous serial data for a valid
telecommand frame. If the frame is valid, the
appropriate subsystem to which the command is to be
scnt is identified and the command is issued, As the
microprocessor processes and issues a command, a
file was assembled (as described in section 5.1), The
model then processes the file to compute the duty
cycle for each register. The results obtained are listed
in Table-I.
Equation 1 was used to calculate the application SEU
cross section associated with the execution of this
software, Since the SFRs of the 8051 processor are,
in fact, eight bit locations within its internal RAM, it
was assumed that, the sensitive bit cross-section for
each register is identical to the sensitive bit cross
section of the RAM. Using results from ground based
radiation testing on a commercial 87C51
microcontroller, the worst case upset rate was
predicted as 3'.0 x 10-6 bif! day-! for the Space
Station Freedom (SSF) orbit (250 nautical miles,
51.6 degrees, 350 km altitude), with assumed
spacecraft shielding thickness of 23 mm and 34 mm
of aluminium for the heavy ion and proton
respectivel/ Although the radiation environment of
the SSF orbit is slightly more benign than that of a
typical UoSAT orbit, shielding on a UoSAT
spacecraft is typically in the range of 11 mm of
aluminium. Hence, the upset rate for this device on a

!

The current instruction is the instruction in the record

currently being processed.

57

,.,

-'

79
67
33
18
63
73
72
14
100
100

Cycle (%)
.98
:::( 99
98
98
100
100
I
0
1

98
100
0
0
0
0

Assuming that the duty cycle for each register is
100%, the observable SEU induced error cross
section for the 8051 processor with 30 eight bit
registers was calculated to be ~ 7 .2x I 0-4 (upset
induced observable errors/CPU-day). This
implies that, within a year, we expect to observe
~0.26 errors in the telecommand system induced
by SEUs per microprocessor. When the duty
cycle for each register was considered, this
number was considerably reduced to ~O.13 (upset
induced observable errors ICPU-year).

In real operation, the observable SEU induced
error rate should be much lower. The above result
assumes that the processor is continuously
decoding commands, which is not true. A typical
UoSA T telecommand system, has four decoders,
three of which are mainly for redundant purposes
and therefore rarely used. Therefore, they are
reset by hardware regularly. By resetting the
device, all SEUs are ovenvritten. The busiest of
the four decoders, processes a maximum of 6
commands every ten minutes. After processing a

6
Veronica Asenek

11th AIAAlUSU Conference on Small Satellites

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

command, the processor goes into idle mode until
another valid command frame is received. It takes at
most 9.4 ms at a frequency 3.46 MHz, to transmit
and process a command frame. This is equivalent to
56.4 ms in every ten minutes. When this fraction is
considered, the duty cycle of some of the registers
(A, B, RI, R2, R3, R4, DPL, DPH, TLO and THO)
can be very small (-9.4x lO·5%), since these registers
are re-Ioaded at the beginning of processing a new
command frame. However, if an upset occurs in a
control registers while the processor is idle. the
adverse effect on the processor will be observed as
soon as the processor wakes up. Following the
assumption of the previous section, the duty cycle for
these registers as execution time increases can be
approximated as 100%. When these values are
considered, the estimated observable SEU error cross
section was predicted as 0.11 (observable SEU
induced errors/CPU-year~processor).

5.1 Discussion
The model is not without limitations. The duty cycle
for non-user accessible registers cannot be calculated
using this model, since it is difficult to determine
from the software when data is written into or read
from these registers. Fortunately. the 8051 processor
does not have many registers of this type. Also, the
duty cycle of the serial buffer register (SBUF).
cannot be calculated. Although this register is user
accessible, it is actually a channel to two non-user
accessible registers (the transmit and receive buffer)
which are separate eight bit loeations of the
processor. In practice, the duration that SBUF holds
useful data is very sholt. However, if an upset occurs
in the receive buffer, it will be transferred via the
SBUF to other registers. To improve the accuracv of
the results, it is suggested that the duty cycle of the
serial buffer be taken as 100% for any program that
uses the receive buffer regularly. In generaL the
influence of hardware on the duty cycle of registers
(both user and non-user accessible) is not be
considered by this model.

engineers to employ COTS microprocessor 111
space applications. The present method for
predicting the observable SEUs induced error rate
in microprocessors ignores the influence of the
software. giving a pessimistic view of the
vulnerability of the device. To consider the
influence of software, the duty factor for each
register as it executes the software must be
determined. In the past this task has been thought
to be impractical for real application software
due to its complexity. With a number of
assumptions. this paper has summarised a new
methodology which demonstrates the use of a
microprocessor simulator. and a model developed
using knowledge of the processor's architecture
and instruction set to achieve this objective. By
analysing a typical flight software code, it was
shown that the influence of software if taken into
consideration could increase the prediction
accuracy by a factor as much as 100%. With
reference to the above limitations. more work is
expected at CSER to improve the accuracy of
this model.
Acknowledgement
The authors will like to thank the Centre for
Satellite
Engineering
Research and the
Department of Mathematics and Computer
Sciences of the University of Surrey for making
this research work possible. Special thanks also
to Neville Bean, Principal Engineer at Surrey
Satellite Technology Limited for his technical
support.
References
Kimbrough et aI, "Single Event Effects and
Performance Predietions for Space Applications
ofRISC Processors", IEEE Transactions on
Nuclear Science, Vol. 41, No.6, Dec. 1994,
Pages 2706-2714.
2

6. Summary and conclusion
The drive towards smaller, faster, better and costeffective satellites implies there is more pressure on

Koga R. et ai, "Techniques of Microprocessor
Testing and SEU-Rate Prediction": IEEE
Transactions on Nuclear Science,
December 1985 page 4219.

7
Veronica Asenek

11 tll AIAA/USU Conference 011 Small Satellites

3

Elder J.H., "A Method for
12
Characterising a Microprocessor's
Vulnerability to SEU", IEEE Trans.
on Nuclear Science, Vol. 35, No.6, dec. 1988.

Peterson E.L. et ai, "Rate Prediction
for Single Event Effects - a Critique";
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science,
December 1992 page 1577.

4

Velazco R et ai, "Heavy Ion Test
Results for the 68020 Microprocessor
and the 68882 Coprocessor",
Proceedings from the 2 nd European
Conference on Radiation and its
Effects on Components and Systems,
RADECS 93.

Sexton F.W., " Measurement of
Single Event Phenomena in Devices
and ICs", IEEE NSREC Short
Course Notes, 1995.
Langworthy J.B., "The Effects of Funneling
on Space Upset Rate", IEEE Transactions on
Nuclear Science, Vol. 40, No.1, Feb. 1993.

5

P.DT O'Connor, "Practical Reliability
nd
Engineering", 2 Edition, John
Wiley & Sons, 1985.

6

Oberg D.L. et ai, "Measurement of the
single event effects in the 87C51
microcontroller"; 1994 Boeing Defence &
Space Group.

7

8

13

14

Guenzer C.S. et ai, "Single Event
Upsets in NMOS Microprocessors";
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear
Science; December 1981 page 3955.
Koga R. et aL "Heavy Ion-Induced Single
Event Upsets of Microcircuits; A Summary
of the Aerospace Corporation Test Data",
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science,
Vol. NS-31, No.6, December 1984.

9

Undenvood c.l., "Single Events Effects in
Commercial Memory Devices in the Space
Radiation Environment", PhD Thesis,
University of Surrey, August 1996.

10

Adams, L., "Cosmic Ray Effects on
Microelectronics", Microelectronic
Journal, Vol. 16, 1985.

II

Akers L.D., "Microprocessor
Technology and Single Event Upset
Susceptibility", Proceeding from the
AIANUtah State University
Conference 1995.

15

Letaw 1. R, "Guidelines for Predicting Single
Event Upsets in Neutron Environments",
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science,
Vol. 38, No.6, Dec 1991.

16

Reed RA, "Implications ofthe
Angle ofIncidence in SEU Testing of
Modem Circuits", IEEE Transactions on
Nuclear Science, VoL 41, No.6, Dec. 1994.

17

Kiel Elektronix, C51 Professional Developers •
Kit, dScope-51, High-Level-Language Debugge_
for the Microcontroller Family. User's
_
Guide 10.91.

18

Intel MCS Tools Handbook, 3
Edition, 1995.

rd

Biography
Veronica Asenek is currently a PhD research
student at CSER. She joined CSER in 1994 after
graduating with a B.Sc. Honours Degree in
Electrical Engineering and Mathematics from the
University of Keele, UK.
Dr Michael Oldfield completed a Ph.D at
University College London In Astronomical
Photon Counting Systems. He joined UoSAT in
Aug 1994 where he worked on a 2-year EPSRC
funded research project entitled "An Investigation
Into Multiple-Bit Upset And Single Event Latchup". He is currently working on another EPSRC
funded project entitled "The Effects Of Space
Radiation On Artificial Neural Networks" due for
completion in Aug 1998.

8
Veronica Asenek

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

11 th AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

